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I. INTRODUCTION

The economic downturn has placed enormous pressure on state
budgets. The recession hit state pension funding plans for public
employees particularly hard.1 Some projections indicate that, even
with as much as an 8% return on their pension fund investments,
seven states' funds will be out of money by 2020, and half of states'
funds will be fully depleted by 2027.2
State legislatures are scrambling to pass measures designed to
return their pension funds to solvency. 3 Most proposals only call for
decreases in the amount of pension benefits provided to future
retirees, but four states have gone much further. Colorado, Minnesota,
South Dakota, and New Jersey have all passed pension reforms that
reduce the amount of benefits to which already-retired public
employees are entitled. These reforms have serious financial
consequences for those retirees. In Colorado, a retiree who received a
pension of $33,264 in 2009 could lose more than $165,000 in benefits
over a twenty-year period. 4 In Minnesota, a retiree receiving an
annual pension of $29,076 in 2008 could lose approximately $28,000 in
benefits over the next ten years. 5 In South Dakota, the average retiree
could take home between $40,264.42 and $77,414.68 less in pension
benefits because of the recently enacted reforms. 6 The New Jersey
reforms are likely to have a similar impact. 7

1.
American States' Pension Funds: A Gold Plated Burden, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at
11, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17248984.
2.
Id.
3.
See, e.g., David Crane, The $500-Billion Pension Time Bomb: The State's Staggering
Unfunded Debt Stands to Crowd Out Many PopularPrograms, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at All
(discussing Governor Schwarzenegger's proposed pension reforms in California); Adrienne Lu,
Christie Wants Public Employees to Work Longer and Pay More for Health Care, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 15, 2010, at Al (discussing proposed New Jersey public employee pension
reform); Dave McKinney & Steve Contorno, State Pension Cuts OK'd: Raises Retirement Age to
67, Ends Double-Dipping, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at 2 (summarizing pension reform
passed by Illinois legislature).
4.
First Amended Class Action Complaint at 8-9, Justus v. State, No. 2010-CV-1589 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Colorado Complaint].
5.
Amended Complaint at 12, Swanson v. State, No. 62-CV-10-5285 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July
2, 2010) [hereinafter Minnesota Complaint].
6.
Complaint at 9, Tice v. State, No. 10-225 (S.D. Cir. Ct. June 2010) [hereinafter South
Dakota Complaint].
7.
Richard P~rez-Pefia, In New Jersey, Lawmakers Curb Worker Benefits, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2011, at Al.
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This Note analyzes the permissibility, under the U.S.
Constitution, of public employee pension reforms that alter the
amount of benefits to which retired employees are entitled, and
proposes a solution to ensure the continued solvency of state public
employee pension funds. Part II examines the underlying causes of the
current pension crisis. Part III discusses current state attempts to
reduce the pension benefits of retired public employees and explains
the legal challenges to these reforms that are currently pending in
state courts. Part IV analyzes the legal claims in more detail and
explores whether pension reforms that reduce benefits for retired
public employees violate substantive due process, the Takings Clause,
or the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Part V proposes that
Congress encourage states to enact minimum funding requirements,
similar to those in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA") that govern private employee pensions, by allowing
states that choose to adopt such requirements to issue tax-exempt
bonds for the purpose of funding public employee pensions.

II. A DEVELOPING STORM: STATES' PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION
SOLVENCY PROBLEMS

Many states' public employee pension systems are severely
underfunded. As of fiscal year 2008, states collectively promised $3.35
trillion in pension, healthcare, and other retirement benefits to
current and retired workers.8 However, the states had only set aside
$2.35 trillion, leaving a one trillion dollar gap between benefits
promised and benefits funded. 9 Although the causes of the current
pension crisis are complex, a recent report compiled by the Pew Center
on the States ("Pew Center") identified four major causes: "(1) the
volatility of pension plan investments; (2) states falling behind in their
payments; (3) ill-considered benefit increases; and (4) other structural
issues." 10
First, the investments states made to fund pensions for public
employees are extremely volatile. The Pew Center's report indicates
that, on average, the value of state pension plan investments
decreased by a median of 25.3% in 2008.11 Similarly, in 2009, the one
8.

PEW CTR.

ON

THE

STATES,

THE

TRILLION DOLLAR

GAP:

UNDERFUNDED

STATE

RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROADS TO REFORM 1 (2010) [hereinafter PEW CTR., TRILLION

DOLLAR GAP].
9.
Id.
10. Id. at 23.
11. Id.
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hundred largest public pension funds lost $165 billion because of
investment declines. 12 To make matters worse, states that were
heavily invested in real estate, such as California, were hurt by recent
declines in the real estate market. 13 The volatility of pension fund
investments also hurt states in another, less obvious way. In the
1990s, pension investments rapidly gained value, and some states
used those increases to justify politically popular increases in
benefits. 14 At the same time, those states lowered employee
contribution rates because the outstanding returns on pension fund
investments meant that their pension systems were overfunded. 15
When the economy declined in 2008 and the value of many state
pension funds plummeted, the ratio of funding to actuarially
calculated liability declined substantially, and state pension systems
no longer had enough assets to sustain the actuarially assessed
16
liability of past promises.
Second, state legislatures failed to keep up with the payments
their pension funds demanded, resulting in consistent underfunding.
Actuaries calculate the amount of money that state legislatures must
put into their systems in order to cover all current obligations, as well
as to control, and eventually eliminate, their plans' unfunded
liability. 7 This calculation produces a dollar figure that, if added to
the public employee pension fund, will ensure sustainability,
assuming the return on investment projections are sound. State
legislatures are not, however, required to contribute that amount and
often contribute less, in both good and bad economic times.' 8 In tough
economic times, legislatures frequently face tight budgetary
constraints, and citizens often need more assistance from the
government. The public employee pension fund is an easy target for
budget cuts necessary to meet those demands. Even in a favorable
economic climate, states have a tendency to underfund public pension

12. Dunstan McNichol, State-Run Funds Mitigate Losses After BP Spill, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), June 23, 2010, at 29.
13. See Robert Selna, Losses Mount for Fund; CalPERS, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 11, 2009, at D1
(noting that real estate holdings made up 6.9% of the California Public Employees Retirement
System's market value and that those holdings had declined by 48.7% in 2009).
14. See PEW CTR., TRILLION DOLLAR GAP, supra note 8, at 23 (discussing such increases in
benefits in Pennsylvania).
15. Id. at 24. For example, in 2000, Colorado's pension system was funded at 105% of its
actuarially assessed value of total promised payouts. Id. at 27.
16. See id. at 17 exhibit 8 (a map showing that, as of 2010, 21 states had funded less than
80% of their public employee pension plan obligations).
17. Id. at 24.
18. Id. at 24-25.
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funds because the return on the funds' investments typically exceeds
projections, and states feel justified in putting less money into the
funds. 19 Largely because of these two factors, twenty-one states
contributed less than 90% of their actuarially required amount
between 2005 and 2010.20 Colorado and Minnesota, two of the three
states that recently decreased current retiree pension benefits, failed
to make their annual required contribution in 2008. According to
actuarial data, Colorado's ideal contribution to its public employee
pension fund in that year was $1,141,081, but it only contributed 68%
of that amount, or $779,644.21 Between 2004 and 2010, Colorado
contributed $2.4 billion less than its ideal actuarial amount to its
public employee pension fund. 22 Minnesota needed to contribute
$1,036,509 to its fund in 2008 to ensure sustainability, but like
Colorado, fell short, contributing only 74% of that amount, or
$767,295.23 As of 2008, 30% of Colorado's actuarially calculated
liability was unfunded, and nearly 19% of Minnesota's liability was
unfunded. 24 South Dakota, the other state that has already passed a
law reducing the amount of pension benefits retired public employees
receive, fared much better, with less than 3% of its actuarial liability
unfunded as of 2008.25
Third, many state legislatures increased benefits without
regard to whether those benefits were adequately funded. In the 1990s
and early 2000s, states often increased entitlements to retirement
benefits instead of increasing salaries but gave little thought to how
they would fund these increases. 26 These increased benefits led to
increased liability on the part of state governments. For example, in
the late 1990s, Colorado promised automatic cost-of-living pension
increases for retirees and decreased the retirement age for employees
19. Id.
20. Id. at 24.
21. Id. at 4 exhibit 1.
22. Id. at 27.
23. Id. at 4 exhibit 1. Interestingly, South Dakota, one of the states that has passed a law
decreasing the amount of benefits that current retirees are entitled to, met its annual actuarially
calculated contribution in 2008, contributing 100% of the required amount to ensure
sustainability, or $95,766. Id. It is unclear why South Dakota would undertake the drastic
reform that they did given that their public employee pension fund is, relatively speaking, in
good shape.
24. Id. Colorado's unfunded liability in 2008 amounted to $16,813,048 out of its total
liability of $55,625,011, while Minnesota's unfunded liability in 2008 was $10,771,507 out of a
total liability of $57,841,634. Id.
25. Id. In 2008, South Dakota's unfunded liability was only $182,870 out of a total liability
of $7,078,007. Id.
26. Id. at 25-26.
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with thirty years of service from fifty-five to fifty. 27 These increased
benefits resulted in a 115% increase in Colorado's liability, while its
pension fund assets only increased by 45%. 28 This failure of state
legislatures to increase contributions to state pension systems in
proportion to benefits is a major contributing factor to the solvency
problem these funds now face.
Finally, the Pew Center report identifies several structural
issues that contributed to the current public employee pension crisis.
First, many public employee pension plans allow employees to retire
at early ages. In California, for example, police officers and firefighters
retire at an average age of fifty-four, and other government employees
retire, on average, at age fifty-nine. 29 Moreover, governments
historically incentivize early retirement in difficult financial times in
an effort to reduce the size of the workforce but fail to account for the
30
resulting increased liability to pension funds.
Second, some states credit employee accounts when pension
fund investments exceed the projected amount. For example, under
Oregon's old public employee pension system, employee contributions
were guaranteed an 8% annual return. 3 1 If the return in any given
year was more than that, employees were credited the extra money. 32
Because employees had already been credited that money, as opposed
to the state reserving it for years when the pension fund's investments
did not generate an 8% return, the state had no way to offset the
losses it incurred when the returns on its investment were less than
8%.33 Third is the problem of "double dipping," which occurs when
"retirees... are given their pensions and then come back to work for a
new salary."34 Pension system representatives in all fifty states
predict that this will be a "significant legislative issue" over the next
35
several years.
Finally, state pension systems also suffer because of the way
states calculate final salaries. Many states determine pension benefits
based on an employee's salary level in his final years of employment.

27.
28.
29.
System
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 27.
Id.
Steve Lopez, Pension Crisis Rings a Bell: Salary Scandal Exposes a Public Pension
off the Rails Statewide, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2010, at A2.
PEW CTR., TRILLION DOLLAR GAP, supra note 8, at 28.
Id.
Id. Oregon has discontinued this program. Id. at 29.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 48 n.104.
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In order to increase benefits, employees have "manipulated the
system" to earn higher salaries in their last several years of
employment by doing things such as "ensuring that overtime goes to
the most senior workers, saving36sick leave and getting temporary
promotions or last-minute raises."
This mismanagement and lack of foresight combined to
produce significant shortfalls for state public employee pension funds
in a very short period. In 2000, state pension plans had a $56 billion
surplus, and the pension systems of more than half the states were
fully funded. 37 Just eight years later, states' pension funds were
collectively underfunded by more than one trillion dollars, and only
four states-Florida, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin-had
38
fully funded pension systems for public employees. As a result, many
states are struggling to regain control of their public pension
programs and have passed reforms designed to bring their pension
plans back to solvency.

III. A LEGAL BATTLE: CHALLENGES TO THE COLORADO, MINNESOTA,
AND SOUTH DAKOTA PENSION REFORMS

Current retirees in Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota
challenged those states' pension reforms on numerous state and
federal constitutional grounds. 39 This Section summarizes Colorado's,
Minnesota's, and South Dakota's attempts to reduce retired public
employee pension benefits and provides a broad outline of the lawsuits
that challenge this legislation. Then, Part IV explores the substance of
those lawsuits' federal constitutional claims in more detail, as an
example of the types of challenges to which similar laws passed in
other jurisdictions might be subject, and analyzes the legality, under
the U.S. Constitution, of state attempts to decrease pension benefits
received by public employees who have already retired.
A. Colorado
On February 23, 2010, the governor of Colorado signed Senate
Bill 10-001 into law. That law made several changes to the Colorado
36. Id. at 29.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Id.
39. The similar New Jersey legislation, which only recently took effect, has not yet been
challenged. It is therefore not discussed in detail here. The federal constitutional analysis of that
legislation is analogous to the analysis below.
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public employee pension system, known as the Public Employees'
Retirement Association. Significantly, the bill eliminated a
guaranteed 3.5% cost-of-living increase for retired state employees,
replacing it with a formula that caps annual cost-of-living increases at
2%.40

Retired Colorado public employees who receive pensions from
the Public Employees' Retirement Association sued the State in the
Denver District Court, alleging that the legislature's changes to the
public employee pension fund as applied to current retirees violate
several provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 41 Specifically, they alleged
that the reforms as applied to current retirees violate the Contracts
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, embodied in Article I, Section 10.42
They also alleged that the reforms violate the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, 43 as well as the right to substantive due process
44
provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.
On June 29, 2011, the Colorado district court judge issued an
order granting the State's motion for summary judgment and
concluding that the plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims were
meritless. 45 The judge found that the "[pilaintiffs unarguably have a
contractual right to their PERA pension itself, [but] they do not have a
contractual right to the specific [cost-of-living adjustment] formula in
place at their respective retirement, for life without change." 46 The

40. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-51-1002 (West 2010). The language here replaced prior
language that stated, in relevant part, that the cost-of-living increase was to be "the total percent
derived by multiplying three and one-half percent, compounded annually, times the number of
years such benefit has been effective." COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-51-1002 (2008) (amended 2010).
41. Colorado Complaint, supranote 4, at 11-12.
42. Id. at 11. This provision states, in relevant part, "[n]o State shall ... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....UU.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
43. Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 11-12. The Takings Clause prohibits the
"tak[ing]" of private property "for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 12. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states
from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Colorado plaintiffs also allege that the pension reforms violate article II,
section 11 of the Colorado Constitution, which states that "[n]o ex post facto law, nor law
impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable
grant of special privileges, franchises, or immunities, shall be passed by the general assembly."
Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 9. The plaintiffs also argue that the reforms violate article
V, section 38 of the Colorado Constitution, which states that "[n]o obligation or liability of any
person, association, or corporation, held or owned by the state, or any municipal corporation
therein, shall ever be exchanged, transferred, remitted, released, or postponed or in any way
diminished by the general assembly, nor shall such liability or obligation be extinguished except
by payment thereof into the proper treasury .. "Id. at 10.
45. Justus v. State, No. 2010-CV-1589, at *12 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011).
46. Id. at *4 (emphasis in original).
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court reasoned, "[flor four decades the [cost-of-living adjustment]
formulas as applied to retirees have repeatedly changed and have
never been frozen at the date of retirement." 47 Given this history, the
court found that a retiree has no reasonable, investment-backed
expectation of a particular cost-of-living adjustment for the duration of
his retirement. 48 Thus, the legislature's adjustment of that formula
49
does not violate the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The court also found that "Plaintiffs' Takings Clause and
Substantive Due Process claims necessarily fail because Plaintiffs'
Contracts Clause [claim] fails." 50 With respect to the Takings Clause,
the court reasoned, "[a]ny arguable property right ... is premised on
the notion that the Plaintiffs have a contractual right to a particular
[cost-of-living adjustment] and thus fails where there is no such
right. '51 Further, the court held, the law does not violate the plaintiffs'
right to substantive due process because, without a contractual right
to a specific cost-of-living adjustment, such a right cannot be
fundamental. 52 Moreover, "the challenged legislation bears a
reasonable relationship to the legitimate governmental interest of
reaching a one hundred percent funded ratio for PERA within the next
thirty years."5 3 The legislation therefore survived rational basis review
54
and did not offend the retirees' right to substantive due process.
B. South Dakota
Prior to South Dakota's recent reforms, post-retirement annual
increases for public employees were fixed at 3.1%. 5 5 The new law fixed
the post-retirement increase in benefits at 2.1% for 2010.56 After 2010,
the annual percentage increase in post-retirement benefits is
calculated based in part on the percent of the actuarial liability of the
pension plan that is funded. 57 If the actuarial accrued liability funded
ratio of the state's public employee pension plan is less than 80% in

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10; see infra Part IV.C.1.
Justus,No. 2010-CV-1589, at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part IVA.

55.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-12-47(41) (2004) (amended 2010).

56.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-12-47(41) (2010).

57.

Id.
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any given year, the annual cost-of-living increase is fixed at 2.1%.58 If
the actuarial accrued liability funded ratio is 80% or greater but less
than 90%, the annual rate of increase is based on the Consumer Price
59
Index but must be "no less than" 2.1% and "no greater than" 2.4%. If
the ratio is 90% or greater but less than 100%, the annual rate of
increase is also based on the Consumer Price Index but may be as
high as 2.8%.60 If the pension plan is fully funded to the extent of its
calculated actuarial liability, the annual cost-of-living increase is
3.1%.61 In the lawsuit challenging this plan, the plaintiffs project that
the average retiree will take home between $40,264.42 and $77,414.68
less in pension benefits over the next twenty years as a result of these
changes, assuming that the South Dakota Retirement System does not
reach 100% funding. 62 Given that South Dakota's public employee
pension plan was not fully funded at any point between 1988 and
63
2010, this is not a far-fetched assumption.
The South Dakota plaintiffs make identical federal
constitutional claims to those asserted in the Colorado lawsuit,
alleging violations of the Contracts Clause, the Takings Clause, and
the right to substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 64 The case is presently pending in the Circuit Court for
the Sixth Judicial Circuit of South Dakota, a state trial court.
C. Minnesota
The Minnesota pension reform law is structured similarly to
that of South Dakota. Prior to the recently enacted reforms, most
retired public employees were entitled to postretirement increases of

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. South Dakota Complaint, supra note 6, at 8-9. Before the changes, the average retiree
would have received $1,021,101.48 in total benefits over twenty years; however, with the
changes, the same retiree will receive between $943,686.80 and $980,836.86 in total benefits over
twenty years.
63.

SOUTH DAKOTA RETIREMENT SYSTEM, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 47

(2010), availableat http://www.sdrs.sd.gov/publications/documents/CAFR2O1O.pdf.
64. South Dakota Complaint, supra note 6, at 11-13. The plaintiffs in the South Dakota
case also argue that the pension reforms in that state violate article VI, section 12 of the South
Dakota Constitution, which provides that "[n]o ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation
of contracts or making any irrevocable grant of privilege, franchise or immunity, shall be
passed." Id. at 10.
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2.5% annually. 65 On May 24, 2010, the Minnesota Legislature
amended this provision, limiting the annual increase to 2% for those
government employees. 66 The reduction applies to employees who
have already retired and continues until "the market value of assets of
the retirement plan equals or exceeds 90% of the actuarial accrued
67
liability of the retirement plan."
Current retirees who receive pensions from Minnesota's public
employee retirement fund sued in the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of Minnesota. Those plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in
the Colorado and South Dakota cases, allege violations of Article I,
Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause. 68 Significantly, however, the Minnesota plaintiffs do
not allege a substantive due process violation. 69 On June 29, 2011, the
Minnesota district court judge entered an order granting the State's
motion for summary judgment and concluding that Minnesota's
70
pension reform law was permissible under the U.S. Constitution.
In rejecting the Contracts Clause challenge, the Minnesota
court found, "[T]here is no express contract to use only the statutory
[cost-of-living] adjustment formula that is in effect as of a member's
retirement."7 1 Moreover, the court found retirees have no implied
contractual right to a particular cost-of-living adjustment because
72
there is no indication the legislature intended to create such a right.
Therefore, changing the formula does not violate the Contracts Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. 73 Moreover, even if there were such a
contractual right, the court added, the law at issue would not
substantially impair that right because "[t]he fundamental retirement
benefit structure for Plaintiffs is the same both before and after
enactment of the challenged legislation [and] Plaintiffs... remain
74
eligible for an annual adjustment based on a statutory formula."
65. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 356.415 (West 2009), amended by 2010 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch.
359, § 78 (West).
66. 2010 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 359, § 78 (West).
67. Id.
68. Minnesota Complaint, supra note 5, at 15-16. The plaintiffs in the Minnesota case also
allege violations of state constitutional law. Specifically, they allege violations of the Contracts
Clause, article I, section 11 of the Minnesota Constitution and the Takings Clause, article I,
section 13 of the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 13-15.
69. See infra note 79.
70. Swanson v. State, No. 62-CV-10-05285, at *1-2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011).
71. Id. at 16.
72. Id. at 19.
73. Id. at 21-25.
74. Id. at 22-23.
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With respect to the Takings Clause, the Minnesota district
court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they
have a property right to a statutory cost-of-living adjustment
formula.7 5 According to the court, the plaintiffs' Takings Clause
challenge "rest[s] ultimately on the expectation that future
76
adjustments would be made pursuant to a particular formula."
Because the court concluded this expectation was unreasonable, the
77
court found that any Takings Clause challenge must fail.
IV. UNSATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS: FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF STATE SOLUTIONS TO THE PENSION SOLVENCY PROBLEM

This Section analyzes federal constitutional challenges to
pension reform laws that reduce the cost-of-living adjustment to which
currently retired employees are entitled in light of the recent
Minnesota and Colorado decisions. First, it considers substantive due
process challenges to these types of reforms. It then explores whether,
despite the holdings of the Minnesota and Colorado district courts,
such reforms constitute a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Finally, it analyzes the viability of arguing that these
types of reforms violate the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10
after the Colorado and Minnesota decisions.
A. Substantive Due Process
In the Colorado and South Dakota lawsuits, 78 the plaintiffs
allege that the state legislatures violated their substantive due
process rights. 79 Plaintiffs in both lawsuits argue their pension
benefits became vested property rights when they became eligible to
retire.80 At that time, plaintiffs' pension benefits included annual costof-living increases that were substantially higher than the cost-ofliving increases they receive under the new reforms.8 1 The plaintiffs
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See supra Part III.A-B.
79. The Minnesota lawsuit does not include a substantive due process challenge. I speculate
that this is because, as I conclude here, any substantive due process challenge to pension reform
laws that alter the amount of benefits to which current retirees are entitled will almost certainly
fail.
80. Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 5; South Dakota Complaint, supra note 6, at 6.
81. See Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 7-9 (summarizing the decrease in the cost-ofliving adjustment for retired Colorado employees, which went from 3.5% before the reforms to a
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argue this reduction constitutes an arbitrary and unlawful
interference with their substantive due process rights. 82 To analyze
the merits of this claim, it is necessary to provide an overview of
substantive due process jurisprudence. This Section first summarizes
how courts analyze substantive due process claims and then applies
the analysis to laws that reduce the pension benefits of public
employees who have already retired.
1. Analysis of Substantive Due Process Claims
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits
states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."8 3 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
language as guaranteeing not only procedural rights but also
substantive rights.84 Thus, the doctrine of substantive due process
provides a mechanism by which courts may "invalidate... legislation
85
if the content is deemed on some basis to be unsatisfactory."
To determine whether a substantive due process claim has
merit, it is first necessary to characterize the nature of the right
purportedly violated. 86 If the right is fundamental, the policy affecting
the right must survive strict scrutiny in order to be upheld. 87 In other
words, the policy must be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest."8 8 However, if the right is not fundamental, the court
will defer to the legislature's judgment and uphold the policy so long
89
as it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.
maximum of 2% after the reforms); South Dakota Complaint, supranote 6, at 7-8 (discussing the
decrease in the cost-of-living adjustment for retired South Dakota employees, which went from
3.1% before the challenged reforms to between 2.1% and 2.8% after the reforms, depending on
the level of funding of the state pension fund).
82. Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 12; South Dakota Complaint, supra note 6, at 13.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. Eric Pearson, Some Thoughts on the Role of Substantive Due Process in the Federal
Constitutional Law of PropertyRights Protection,25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2008).
85. Id. at 1.
86. See Davida H. Isaacs, Shifting Constitutional Sands: Can and Should Patentholders
Rely on the Due Process Clause to Thwart Government Action?, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 627, 660
(2008).
87. Id.; see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.").
88. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
89. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("[Tlhe
law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
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To determine whether a right is fundamental for substantive
due process purposes, the Supreme Court looks to whether the right is
"'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'.. . and 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [the right was] sacrificed.' "90 The Court also cautions
that the asserted right must be carefully described. 91
Generally, economic rights are not fundamental. In West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, which exemplifies the Court's traditionally
deferential review of substantive due process challenges to economic
and social legislation, the Court held that freedom to contract was not
a fundamental right for substantive due process purposes. 92 In that
case, the plaintiff challenged a state law establishing a minimum
wage for women on substantive due process grounds. 93 Such a law
implicated the right to contract because it affected whether employers
and employees could agree on a wage structure. In rejecting this
challenge, the Court noted that the Constitution does not explicitly
guarantee a right to contract. 9 4 The Court further explained that the
right to liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment does not
protect an absolute right to contract. 95 Instead, it protects from
"arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and
prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community." 96 Following
the decision in West Coast Hotel, the Court continued to uphold
economic regulations against substantive due process challenges. The
Court has not struck down any economic regulation on substantive
due process grounds since 1937 and has continued to apply rational
97
basis review to such cases.
Under rational basis review, the Court will uphold the
challenged policy so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."); Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at
152 ("[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators." (citing Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S.
580, 584 (1935)).
90. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
91. Id. at 721.
92. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937).
93. Id. at 388.
94. Id. at 391.
95. Id. at 392.
96. Id. (quoting Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 565 (1911)).
97.

2006).

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 625 (3d ed.
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government purpose. 98 Courts may infer a legitimate government
purpose, even in the absence of a specific legislative declaration.
Under this deferential framework, the courts must uphold a policy so
long as there is any conceivable rational relationship between the law
and a legitimate government purpose. 99 Moreover, a court may not
strike down a policy simply because it believes the policy is unwise.
The legislature, not the courts, judges the wisdom of adopting a
particular policy. All that is required to survive rational basis review
is that "there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it." 100

In Pension Benefits Guarantee Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., the
Supreme Court suggested courts that analyze legislation affecting the
distribution of retirement benefits should employ rational basis
review. Pension Benefits presented a substantive due process
challenge to a portion of ERISA, which Congress enacted in large part
to "guarantee that 'if a worker has been promised a defined pension
benefit upon retirement-and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions
are required to obtain a vested benefit-he will actually receive it.' "101
In order to effect this purpose, Congress passed a law, the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 ("MPPAA"),
that required employers who withdrew from multiemployer pension
10 2
plans to pay a certain amount of money to the pension plan.
Specifically, the withdrawing employer was required to pay "the
employer's proportionate share of the plan's 'unfunded vested
benefits', calculated as the difference between the present value of
vested benefits and the current value of the plan's assets."'10 3
Plaintiff R.A. Gray & Co. was a member of a multiemployer
04
pension plan and indicated its intent to withdraw from the plan.
After R.A. Gray indicated its desire to withdraw, Congress passed the
MPPAA, which included a retroactivity provision that made it
98. Id.
99. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (upholding an
Oklahoma law prohibiting opticians from duplicating lenses without a prescription from an
optometrist or ophthalmologist because "[t]he legislature might have concluded that the
frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regulation of
the fitting of eyeglasses" (emphasis added)).
100. Id. at 488.
101. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984) (quoting
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980)).
102. Id. at 724-25.
103. Id. at 725.
104. Id.
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applicable to R.A. Gray. 10 5 The pension plan then notified R.A. Gray
that it was required to pay $201,359 before withdrawing from the
plan. 10 6 R.A. Gray filed suit, alleging the retroactive application of the
law to R.A. Gray violated R.A. Gray's right to substantive due process,
because it was "arbitrary and irrational, and because it impaired the
collective-bargaining agreements that Gray had signed."' 0 7
In upholding the retroactive application of the MPPAA, the
Court noted that it presumes economic legislation is constitutional,
and that the plaintiff carries the burden of showing "that the
legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way."1 08 As long as
the retroactive application of the MPPAA was "justified by a rational
legislative purpose," it would not violate substantive due process. 10 9
Significantly, the Court noted its "cases are clear that legislation
readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets
otherwise settled expectations."' 10 The Court found it "eminently
rational for Congress to conclude that the purposes of the MPPAA
could be more fully effectuated if its withdrawal liability provisions
were applied retroactively."'1 1 Therefore, the retroactive application of
the MPPAA did not violate R.A. Gray's substantive due process
112
rights.
2. Application of the Substantive Due Process Analysis to Pension
Reform Lawsuits
A court should apply rational basis review to laws that reduce
retired public employee pension benefits. It is unwise to treat public
employees' rights to a defined amount of pension benefits as
fundamental. Such a ruling would not be in accord with Supreme
Court precedent.11 3 R.A. Gray & Co. strongly suggests courts analyze
legislation affecting pension plans as economic legislation for
substantive due process purposes. The right to a predetermined
pension is analogous to the right to contract that the Supreme Court
held was not fundamental in West Coast Hotel. Like the right to

105.
106,
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 726.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 725-26.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 734.
See supra Part V.A.1.
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contract, it does not appear in the text of the Constitution. Nor is
there any evidence that granting pensions to public employees is "
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'. . . and 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.' "114 State governments did not
begin to offer pensions to their employees until the early twentieth
century. 115 As late as 1961, five states still did not provide pensions for
public employees.116 A public employee's right to any pension benefits,
let alone his right to a specific level of annual cost-of-living
adjustments, is not a fundamental right. Perhaps for these reasons,
neither the Colorado nor the South Dakota plaintiffs even attempt to
assert a fundamental right.
The Colorado and South Dakota plaintiffs argue that with
regard to state employee pension reduction, the legislatures made
arbitrary decisions.1 17 Plaintiffs argue that even under deferential
rational basis review, the legislatures' decisions to modify the terms of
pension agreements violate substantive due process.11 8 They are
wrong.
Laws that reduce the amount of benefits to which retired public
employees are entitled satisfy rational basis review because they are
rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate government
purpose. For example, the Colorado legislature titled its law, "An Act
Concerning Modifications to the Public Employees' Retirement
Association Necessary to Reach a One Hundred Percent Funded Ratio
Within the Next Thirty Years."'1 9 Given this title, along with the fact
that, at the end of fiscal year 2008, Colorado's public employee pension
plan was only 70% funded, it is reasonable to infer that the legislature
intended Senate Bill 10-001 to help return Colorado's public employee
pension system to solvency. 120 This is unquestionably a legitimate
government purpose. 21 Moreover, decreasing the rate of the annual
cost-of-living adjustments to which both current and future retirees
114. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted).
115. Olivia S. Mitchell, The Future of Public Employee Retirement Systems, in THE FUTURE
OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 1, 9 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Gary Anderson eds., 2009).
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id.
118. Colorado Complaint, supranote 4, at 12; South Dakota Complaint, supra note 6, at 13.
119. Act of Feb. 23, 2010, ch. 2, 2010 Colo. Legis. Serv. 2 (West).
120. PEW CTR., TRILLION DOLLAR GAP, supranote 8, at 17 exhibit 8.
121. See, e.g., Leheny v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 1999) (legislating to
maintain "fiscal integrity" of a government benefits system is a legitimate government purpose);
Flaherty v. Giambra, 446 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (reducing costs so as to reduce
the burden on taxpayers is a legitimate government purpose).
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are entitled is rationally related to this purpose. By decreasing the
rate of the annual cost-of-living adjustment, the state must pay less
money each year to the beneficiaries of the public employee pension
system. The savings will become greater over time, as the reduced
rates cause the principals on which the cost-of-living adjustments
must be paid to become smaller than they would have been had the
cost-of-living adjustment not been decreased.
While a legislature could reduce its pension liability by only
decreasing the cost-of-living adjustment for employees who are not yet
vested in the pension system, the fact that it chooses not to do so is not
fatal to the substantive due process inquiry. When applying rational
basis review to substantive due process claims, courts need not
concern themselves with the precise means by which the legislature
chooses to act. 122 Moreover, to the extent that the law applies
retroactively because it changes the benefits to which already vested
employees are entitled, the substantive due process analysis is the
same. As the Supreme Court explained in R.A. Gray & Co., retroactive
economic legislation survives a substantive due process challenge
where "the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified
123
by a rational legislative purpose."'
Here, the Colorado legislature could have rationally concluded
that applying the reduction in the rate of the cost-of-living adjustment
to employees who were already vested in the retirement system would
better help achieve the goal of fully funding the public employees'
pension fund. The language quoted above from R.A. Gray & Co. is
instructive: "[L]egislation readjusting rights and burdens is not
1 24
unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations.'
Similarly, the South Dakota pension reform law does not
violate plaintiffs' rights to substantive due process. Although there is
no indication in either the legislative history or the text itself of the
South Dakota law that the legislature adopted the pension reforms to
ensure that the public employee pension fund remains solvent, there
is ample evidence to conclude this was conceivably the legislature's
motivation. The legislature was most likely aware of the recent Pew
Center report and the problems facing public employee pension funds
in other states, and it is not a stretch to assume the legislature was
122. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is gone

when the Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws.., because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.").
123. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984).
124. Id. at 729 (internal quotations omitted).
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motivated by a desire to ensure that South Dakota's public employee
pension fund become fully funded. The law's coupling of the rate of the
annual cost-of-living adjustment to which public employees are
entitled with the level of funding of the pension system as a whole
125
implies such an intent.
Even if this intent cannot be conclusively proven, the South
Dakota law survives a substantive due process challenge. The South
Dakota legislature could have plausibly concluded that tying the rate
of annual cost-of-living adjustments to the level of funding of the
pension system as a whole was a rational way to achieve a legitimate
government purpose, namely ensuring that the state public employee
pension fund remains solvent. South Dakota's law therefore survives
substantive due process review.
Given that courts will likely evaluate any legislation affecting
the level of benefits to which a currently retired individual is entitled
under rational basis review and that preserving public employee
pension fund solvency is a legitimate government purpose, substantive
due process challenges to such laws fail. In fact, a Colorado district
court correctly rejected a substantive due process challenge to this
type of pension reform, concluding that the right to a particular
pension benefit is not a fundamental right and that the law was
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Because of the
extremely deferential review of substantive due process challenges to
economic legislation, any substantive due process challenge to this
type of pension reform will fail. Thus, plaintiffs should look to other
areas of the Constitution.
B. Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits taking
"private property ... for public use, without just compensation."' 126
Although the Takings Clause, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, did not
originally limit the power of state governments, the Supreme Court
held the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Takings Clause to
the states. 127 To show a taking, the plaintiff must first establish the

125. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-12-47(41) (2010) (describing the various methods of
calculating the rate of the annual cost-of-living adjustment based on the level of funding of the

public employee pension fund).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

127. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1897).
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government's action infringed on his property interest. 128 Next, the
plaintiff must show that the detriment to his property interest was
caused directly by the government's conduct.' 29 Once these two
threshold elements have been established, a court must determine
whether the government's taking was for a "public use."'130 If the
taking was not for a public use, the government action cannot be
sustained, regardless of whether the plaintiff was compensated for the
loss. 1 3 ' If the taking was for public use, then the court must determine
whether the government paid "just compensation" to the person whose
132
property interest it violated.
In the lawsuits challenging the Colorado, Minnesota, and
South Dakota pension reforms, the plaintiffs allege vested members of
the public employee pension plans have a property interest in
continuing to receive their pensions at the rates specified by statute at
the time they began receiving benefits. 33 The plaintiffs contend the
pension reform laws that decrease the amount of compensation to
which they are entitled constitute takings under the Fifth
Amendment, as incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, because they amount to government infringement on the
plaintiffs' property interests without just compensation. 134
1. Property Interest
To successfully challenge pension reform laws under the
Takings Clause, a plaintiff must first establish he has a property
interest in receiving pension benefits at the pre-reform cost-of-living
adjustment level. The Supreme Court held that property interests
"extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or
money."' 35 At least two states-Connecticut and New Mexico136
recognize a property interest in public employee pension benefits.
128. Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307,

317 (2007).
129. Id. at 321.
130. See id. at 326 ("If [a taking] is not [for public use], the government act is void regardless
of whether compensation is paid.").

131. Id.
132. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 640.
133. Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 11; Minnesota Complaint, supra note 5, at 16;
South Dakota Complaint, supra note 6, at 12.
134. Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 12; Minnesota Complaint, supra note 5, at 16;
South Dakota Complaint, supra note 6, at 12.
135. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
136. See Amy B. Monahan, Public PensionPlan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN.
& POL'Y 617, 638-39 tbl.1 (2010) (summarizing the legal protections granted by each state to
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Despite this property interest, Takings Clause challenges to
modifications of public employee pension systems have uniformly
failed.137
The recent Colorado and Minnesota cases are no different. In
those cases, the district courts concluded retirees do not have a
138
property interest to a specific cost-of-living adjustment formula.
Thus, those courts concluded, the Colorado and Minnesota pension
reform laws do not violate the Takings Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
Despite this holding, a plaintiff challenging a similar pension
reform law would be wise to include a Takings Clause challenge.
Because state law determines whether a property interest exists, the
Colorado and Minnesota decisions have no precedential value outside
of those states. The rest of this Section explains how a plaintiff might
argue that a reduction in an annual cost-of-living adjustment as
applied to current retirees violates the Takings Clause once a state
court finds a plaintiff has a property right to a fixed cost-of-living
adjustment.
2. Detriment to the Property Interest Caused by Government Conduct
Because legislative reform of the pension benefits to which
public employees are entitled does not constitute a physical
deprivation of property, to succeed on a Takings Clause claim, the
plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate that the deprivation of pension
benefits caused a regulatory taking. The Supreme Court articulated
the framework of such a claim in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.
The Court explained that a showing of physical occupation of one's
property by the government is not a prerequisite to a successful
Takings Clause challenge. Rather, a plaintiff may establish a taking
by demonstrating that the government's regulation of his property

public employee pensions); see also N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 22D ("Upon meeting the minimum
service requirements of an applicable retirement plan created by law for employees of the state.
• . , a member of a plan shall acquire a vested property right .... "); Pineman v. Oechslin, 488
A.2d 803, 810 (Conn. 1985) ("[The statutory pension scheme establishes a property interest on
behalf of all state employees in the existing retirement fund. . ).
137. Monahan, supra note 136, at 637. But see Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 304 (N.M. 1995)
(suggesting that "public retirement plans create a property interest upon vesting" that "may not
be taken without just compensation," but deciding the case on other grounds); Copeland v.
Copeland, 575 P.2d 99, 102 (N.M. 1978) (noting in dicta that "[a] retirement right that has
'vested' is a property right" that is entitled to Constitutional protection).
138. Justus v. State, No. 2010-CV-1589, at *11 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011); Swanson v.
State, No. 62-CV-10-05285, at *26 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011).
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impermissibly infringes on the plaintiffs property interest. 139 Since
that landmark decision, the Court articulated the framework under
which it analyzes regulatory takings claims, applying a three-factor
test:
[W]e have eschewed the development of any set formula for identifying a "taking"
forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, and have relied instead on ad hoc, factual
inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case. To aid in this
determination, however, we have identified three factors which have "particular
significance": (1) "the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
140
expectations"; and (3) "the character of the governmental action."

Courts can apply this three-factor analysis to public employee
pension reform laws that decrease the amount of benefits to which
retirees are entitled. The first factor considers the economic impact
the challenged law has on the plaintiffs. This factor weighs in favor of
finding a governmental taking, because pension reform laws that
reduce the amount of benefits a current retiree will receive adversely
affect those retirees economically.14 1 Moreover, in the four such laws
that have already been passed, there are no features that mitigate the
loss of promised earnings, further contributing to a finding that these
types of legislative actions have an adverse economic impact on
14 2
current retirees.
The second factor requires courts to analyze "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations" of the plaintiffs. 143 To constitute a reasonable
investment-backed expectation, a plaintiff must be able to
demonstrate that he has more than "a mere unilateral expectation or
an abstract need" for the property in question. 44 In Pineman v.
Fallon, the Second Circuit held that a showing of a contractual right
to a benefit is necessary to show a frustration of reasonable
investment-based expectations. 145 This is potentially problematic
because, in states that recognize property rights to pension benefits,
139. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
140. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986) (citations
omitted).
141. For examples of allegations that these types of pension reforms result in substantial
economic harm to current retirees from the ongoing Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota
lawsuits, see supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
142. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225-26 (noting that provisions that moderate or mitigate the
economic impact can lead to a finding that a plaintiffs economic interest is not sufficiently
affected).
143. Id. at 224-25.
144. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
145. Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 603 (2d Cir. 1988).
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courts have traditionally declined to recognize that a pension creates a
contractual obligation. 146 Although that decision appears to foreclose
any Takings Clause challenge, Pineman v. Fallon is distinguishable
because its reasoning depends on having plaintiffs who are not yet
147
vested in the pension system.
To convince a court that a retiree has a reasonable investmentbacked expectation of the specific cost-of-living formula in place when
he retired, a plaintiff should argue that public employees who have
already become vested in a retirement system have more than a
unilateral expectation in continuing to receive benefits in the manner
they were promised when they became vested in the system. Although
the recent Minnesota district court opinion rejected such a claim, at
least one state court appears amenable to it. In Pierce v. State, the
New Mexico Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
repeal of state income tax exemptions that retirees received through
public employee pension plans. 148 The court held that the legislation
did not violate the Takings Clause because "there [was] no vested
right to receive pension benefits free from tax."'149 The court found,
however, that "public retirement plans create a property interest [in
the amount of pension benefits promised] upon vesting" that is
protected by the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 150 Hence,
"any action by the legislature that serves 'to terminate, diminish or
alter' the value of pension benefits ... must be compensated for by
providing an equal or greater benefit."'151 Thus, for that court, the
critical distinction in whether there is a reasonable investment-based
expectation in a specified formula for calculating the cost-of-living
adjustment is whether the employee is vested in the system. Unlike
the removal of the tax exemption in Pierce, which did not affect the
amount of pension benefits that the retiree received but only the
amount of tax he was required pay, a decrease in the cost-of-living
adjustment directly alters the amount of benefits to which vested
employees are entitled. 15 2 Thus, those retirees arguably have a
146. See, e.g., Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 808-09 (Conn. 1985).
147. See Fallon, 842 F.2d at 602 (noting that the modifications there were being challenged
because they put employees who would vest within five years in a better position than employees
who would vest in more than five years).
148. Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 292 (N.M. 1995).
149. Id. at 304.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. (quoting Copeland v. Copeland, 575 P.2d 99, 102 (N.M. 1978)).
152. Cf. id. at 302 ("Although the substantive right to receive benefits confers a property
right upon vesting, the tax exemptions are not contained within the provisions defining the
substantive rights of employees to receive benefits.").
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reasonable investment-based expectation in the annual cost-of-living
increase at the rate in place when they retired.
The third factor courts must consider in determining whether a
regulatory taking is present is the character of the governmental
action. In an early formulation of this factor, the Supreme Court
explained that a taking "may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government ...than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good." 153 One permissible consideration is "a
balancing of the public interest advanced by the government
measure[d] against the burden on the property owner." 154 At least one
federal court of appeals has interpreted this requirement to mean
that, to establish a regulatory taking, the plaintiff must show that
"the government has improperly shifted a public burden to a small
155
class of private parties."
Here, the primary justification for reducing the rate of annual
cost-of-living increases to which public employees are entitled is the
states' desires to return their public employee pension systems to
solvency.' 56 Although this may seem like a public program designed to
promote the common good, the plaintiffs fall within a small group of
people who must carry a greater share of the public burden in
decreasing the unfunded liability of the public pension reform plans.
In many instances, states took money out of public employee pension
funds (or the actuarially required contributions were not met) because
state officials decided it was in the public's best interest to use that
money elsewhere. While only public employees would be harmed by
the depletion of these funds, other citizens benefitted at the expense of
public employees by enjoying otherwise impossible programs. 15 7 The
legislatures in many states chose to fund other programs at the
expense of the public employee retirement fund.
Because of this choice, public employee retirement funds in
many states are in bad shape. 158 The problem from a Takings Clause
perspective is that the legislatures' current solutions unfairly place
the burden of funding those additional programs on public employees
153. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
154. Meltz, supra note 128, at 342.
155. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
156. See supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
157. See id.
158. See id.
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by forcing them to accept decreased pension benefits. Therefore, the
they
government's conduct deprives retirees of any property interest
159
might have in the cost-of-living provisions of their pensions.
3. Public Use
Assuming the plaintiffs can establish a regulatory taking, the
next element a court must consider is whether such a taking is for
public use. If the taking is for private, and not public use, then the
government is not justified in taking the property and must return it
to the plaintiffs. 160 The Supreme Court has interpreted the public use
requirement broadly. As long as a taking is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest, that taking is for public use.1 61 In
Berman v. Parker, for example, the Court held that the District of
Columbia's use of its eminent domain power to acquire some
dilapidated properties with the intent of selling or leasing them to
private parties for development constituted a public use for Takings
Clause purposes. 162 If selling blighted property to private developers
constitutes public use, then reducing the amount of benefits retirees
receive from public employee pension funds for the purpose of making
those funds solvent must also be a public use. Such a reduction is
163
rationally related to a legitimate public interest.
4. Just Compensation
Under the Takings Clause, when a government entity takes a
private individual's property for public use, it must provide just
compensation. In order to determine the amount of compensation that
is just, the relevant inquiry is the loss in value the private property
owner suffers, not the gain the government receives.' 64 Thus, just
compensation is typically calculated as "the fair market value of the
property on the date it is appropriated.' 6 5
159. See Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1328 (finding a taking where federal law altered
plaintiffs' ability to pre-pay mortgages).
160. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 97, at 662.
161. Id.
162. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
163. See supra Part IV.A.
164. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 97, at 664.
165. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). Exceptions to using fair
market value to determine the amount of compensation that the government must pay arise only
in limited circumstances, specifically "when market value [is] too difficult to find, or when its
application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public ...." Id. at 10 n.14 (alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)).
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Here, the fair market value of the property that the plaintiffs
lost is easily calculated. To determine the amount of compensation to
which a current retiree is entitled, one need only subtract the amount
of benefits the retiree received after the reform from the amount of
benefits the pension recipient would have received under the prereform annual cost-of-living adjustment. This calculation will produce
a dollar figure that represents the fair market value of the property
the government took from the plaintiffs as a result of the challenged
legislative action.
Based on the foregoing analysis, there is a strong possibility
that plaintiffs challenging reductions in the pension benefits provided
to currently retired employees will be able to establish a Takings
Clause violation. There is, however, one caveat. A necessary
prerequisite to succeeding on a Takings Clause claim is judicial
recognition that public employee pensions create a property right.
State law determines whether such a right exists. The Minnesota and
Colorado courts that considered challenges to recent public employee
pension reforms refused to find one. However, those decisions rested
on an interpretation of state law. Therefore,. they are of no
precedential value in other states. Only two states-New Mexico and
Connecticut-have explicitly held that vested employees (those
eligible for retirement and those who have already retired) have a
property right to the level of benefits provided at the time they became
vested. 166 Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking to challenge a law that
reduces the amount of benefits that vested retirees in a state's public
employee retirement system will receive should include a Takings
Clause challenge in his lawsuit.
C. Contracts Clause
Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution states that "[n]o
State shall.., pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." 167 During the early 1800s, the Supreme Court interpreted
the Contracts Clause as a significant limitation on the power of state
governments.1 68 However, the Supreme Court greatly cabined the

166. N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 22D ("Upon meeting the minimum service requirements of an
applicable retirement plan created by law for employees of the state .... a member of a plan
shall acquire a vested property right .. ");Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 810 (Conn. 1985)
("[The statutory pension scheme establishes a property interest on behalf of all state employees
in the existing retirement fund ...").
167. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10 cl.1.
168. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 97, at 631.
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scope of these decisions during the New Deal era. Home Building &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell involved a Contracts Clause challenge to the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, which temporarily prevented
mortgage companies from foreclosing on properties in the state
because of the Great Depression. 169 Although the law interfered with a
contractual obligation between two private parties, the Court upheld
it, holding that Contracts Clause protection "is not.., absolute...
and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical
formula." 170 The Court reasoned that states' obligation to "safeguard
the vital interests of [their] people" must be "read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. '171 Therefore, "[t]he economic interests of
the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant
protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts." 172 In
order to determine whether a state law unconstitutionally impairs the
right of two private parties to contract, the Court uses an inquiry
similar to rational basis review of economic legislation for substantive
due process purposes.1 73 In Blaisdell, the Court explained that an
exercise of the government's police power does not offend the
Contracts Clause, even if it impairs contractual obligations between
two private parties, so long as "the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and
174
appropriate to that end."'
Although Blaisdell contemplates very deferential review of
Contracts Clause challenges to legislation, the Court has indicated
that heightened scrutiny is appropriate in cases that implicate
impairments of the obligation of contracts to which the government is
a party.175 United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey instructs
that plaintiffs must establish the following elements to succeed on a
Contracts Clause claim involving an unconstitutional impairment of
the government's contractual obligations: (1) there is a contract
between the government and the plaintiffs; (2) the challenged law
impairs an obligation of that contract; and (3) the impairment is not
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose. 17 6 In
that case, the Court considered a Contracts Clause challenge to the
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1934).
Id. at 428.
Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 437.
See supra Part IV.A.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438.
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1977).
Id. at 17, 21, 25-26.
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repeal of a law that prohibited using money earned from tolls on
highways controlled by the Port Authority of New Jersey and New
York to subsidize passenger rail service.1 77 The repeal adversely
affected Port Authority bondholders, because the purpose of the law
had been to pledge the toll revenue as security on the bonds that the
Port Authority had issued. 178 The United States Trust Company of
New York brought suit on behalf of all holders of the bonds, alleging
that the repeal of the law limiting the use of the toll revenue violated
179
the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Court first considered whether the statute that limited the
power of the Port Authority to spend the revenues it earned through
toll collection constituted a contract between the State and the Port
Authority's bondholders. The Court held, "[A] statute is itself treated
as a contract when the language and circumstances evince a
legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature
enforceable against the State."18 0 The Court found that "[tihe intent to
make a contract is clear from the statutory language: 'The 2 States
covenant and agree with each other and with the holders of any

affected bonds.

.' "181

Having found a contract, the Court considered

whether the repeal of the statute constituted an impairment of that
contract. Because the State had not attempted to compensate the
bondholders for any loss in value of the bonds, the Court concluded
18 2
that the repeal was an impairment of a contractual obligation.
However, this finding did not end the inquiry. As the Court
explained, "a finding that there has been a technical impairment is
merely a preliminary step in resolving the more difficult question
whether that impairment is permitted under the Constitution."'' 83
While the Court allows a state legislature to impair the contractual
obligation of two private parties so long as it acts rationally to further
a legitimate government purpose, 184 it imposes a more exacting
standard when the state legislature acts to impair its own contractual
obligation, because "[i]f a State could reduce its financial obligations
whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an
important public purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 17 n.14.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934).
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protection at all." 18 5 Therefore, the United States Trust Co. court held
that a government may only impair its own contractual obligations
when "it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose. ' 18 6 Moreover, when a law impairs a government's own
contractual obligations, "complete deference to a legislative
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate . . . ."187
Thus, although it is somewhat unclear what standard of review the
Court applies to Contracts Clause cases where the government
impairs its own contractual obligations, the use of the word
"necessary," coupled with the lack of deference to the state
legislature's judgment and the insistence on an "important"
governmental purpose, suggest that the Court is applying some form
of heightened scrutiny.188
Applying heightened scrutiny to the facts of United States
Trust Co., the Court concluded the repeal of the restriction on
spending Port Authority toll revenue violated the Contracts Clause,
noting that "the States could have adopted alternative means of
achieving their twin goals" without impairing their contractual
obligations to the holders of the Port Authority bonds.18 9 Thus, the
Court indicated it was amenable to striking down legislation
impairing the government's contractual obligations when the plaintiffs
can demonstrate the government had alternative means of achieving
the same goal without interfering with government contracts with
private parties.
The plaintiffs in the Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota
cases assert that those states' pension reform laws, as applied to
current retirees, violate the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
because they cannot satisfy the heightened standard set forth in
United States Trust Co. The plaintiffs first argue that the statutes
that create pensions for public employees create contractual
obligations between the states and those employees once the
employees become vested in the system.190 Second, they allege that the
legislative pension reforms that adjust the method of calculating the
annual cost-of-living adjustment and result in plaintiffs receiving less
185. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 26.
186. Id. at 25.
187. Id. at 26.
188. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 639 (suggesting that the Court is applying strict
scrutiny).
189. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 30.
190. Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 10; Minnesota Complaint, supra note 5, at 15;
South Dakota Complaint, supranote 6, at 12.
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benefits each year than they would have received under the prior law
constitute an impairment of these contractual obligations. 191 Finally,
the plaintiffs allege that this impairment is neither reasonable nor
necessary to achieve the states' objectives of returning their public
192
employee pension funds to solvency.
1. Is There a Contract?
To determine whether such a Contracts Clause claim has
merit, it is first necessary to determine whether there is a contract
between the state government and the public employees with regard
to the amount of pension benefits to which they are entitled. According
to a recent study of public employee pensions, constitutional,
statutory, or case law in thirty-five states supports a finding that
public employees have a contractual right to the pension benefits in
place at the time they retire.193 In those states, the next step will be to
determine whether the statutorily provided formula for calculating the
rate of the annual cost-of-living adjustment is included in the contract.
There is a strong argument that it is. As the Supreme Court explained
in United States Trust Co., courts presume that "contracting parties
adopt the terms of their bargain in reliance on the law in effect at the
1 94 One can thus argue that the law in
time the agreement is reached."
effect at the time the employees' rights became vested, including the
cost-of-living adjustment, became part of the contractual agreement
between the state government and the employees. This makes sense
because retirees rely on the current cost-of-living adjustment rates
1 95
when planning financial decisions as they enter retirement.
Although this is a strong argument based directly on the
language of a U.S. Supreme Court decision, the Colorado and
Minnesota district courts rejected it. They concluded that, while public
191. Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 10; Minnesota Complaint, supra note 5, at 15;
South Dakota Complaint, supra note 6, at 12.
192. Colorado Complaint, supra note 4, at 10; Minnesota Complaint, supra note 5, at 15;
South Dakota Complaint, supra note 6, at 12.
193. See State Constitutional Protections for Public Sector Retirement Benefits, NAT'L
CONFERENCE ON PUB. EMP. RET. Sys., http:// www.ncpers.org/Files/News/03152007RetireBenefit

Protections.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2011) (finding support for such protection in Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
194. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19 n.17 (emphasis added).
195. For example, a retiree might choose to invest less money than he otherwise would in
reliance on the promise that the value of his pension would continue to increase at a fixed rate.
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employees have a contractual right to their pensions, they do not have
a contractual right to a specific cost-of-living adjustment, because the
formulas those states use to calculate such an adjustment have
frequently changed in the past.196 This finding, however, is not fatal to
Contracts Clause challenges to other states' pension reform laws. The
finding of a lack of a contractual right is merely an interpretation of
state law and therefore has no precedential value outside of those two
states. Retired public employees challenging similar pension reform
laws should therefore still argue that they have a contractual right to
the specific cost-of-living adjustment in place at the time they retired.
The rest of this Section assumes that a court will find such a right and
analyzes whether the impairment of that right violates the Contracts
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
2. Impairment of the Contractual Obligation
Assuming a contract to continue to provide the specific cost-ofliving formula in place at the time of retirement exists between a state
and its public employees, the next question is whether a change to
that formula impairs that contractual obligation. In United States
Trust Co., the Supreme Court found there was a contractual
impairment, because the State did not make any effort to compensate
the bondholders for any decrease in value of the bonds that resulted
19 7
from the repeal of the restrictions on spending the toll revenue.
Given this finding, it is difficult to see how a court could conclude that
a pension reform law that reduces the amount of benefits to which
current retirees are entitled would not impair a contractual obligation.
Like the state government in United States Trust Co., the state
governments at issue here did not attempt to compensate plaintiffs for
the reduced annual cost-of-living adjustment. This lack of
compensation constitutes an impairment of contract of exactly the
kind that justifies the heightened scrutiny that United States Trust
Co. applies to cases in which the government passes a law impairing
198
its own contractual obligations.
The Minnesota district court's finding that the pension reform
law does not constitute a contractual impairment because "[t]he

196. Justus v. State, No. 2010-CV-1589, at *4-5 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011); Swanson v.
State, No. 62-CV-10.05285, at *19-20 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011).
197. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S at 19.
198. See id. at 26 ("If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to
spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause would
provide no protection at all.").
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fundamental retirement benefit structure for Plaintiffs is the same
both before and after enactment of the challenged legislation" is at
odds with United States Trust Co. and should be rejected by other
courts. 199 First, because the Minnesota court also concluded that no
contractual right to a specific cost-of-living adjustment exists under
state law, its analysis of whether a change to that right would
constitute an impairment is merely dicta and has no precedential
value. More importantly, just because retirees continue to receive an
annual cost-of-living adjustment does not mean any contractual right
they have to such a benefit has not been impaired. In United States
Trust Co. itself, the U.S. Supreme Court found a contractual
impairment where the repeal of a law reduced the value of bonds held
by the plaintiffs. 200 The fact that the plaintiffs still held the bonds, or
that the bonds still had some value, did not mean that the government
had not impaired the contractual obligation. Rather, any decrease in
the value of those bonds as a result of the change in the law created an
impairment of a contractual obligation. Thus, any decrease in the
future value of a retiree's pension fund as a result of the change in the
law should similarly constitute such an impairment.
3. Permissibility of the Impairment
A court must next determine whether that impairment is
allowed under the Contracts Clause. United States Trust Co. provides
the test: "[A]n impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose." 20 1 States pass
laws that reduce the amount of benefits to which current retirees
drawing funds from the public employee retirement systems are
entitled for the purpose of returning the state public employee pension
funds to solvency. This may be an important public purpose, but even
if it is, the laws are not both reasonable and necessary to that purpose.
There are less restrictive alternatives that the state governments
199. Swanson v. State, No. 62-CV-10-05285, slip op. at 23 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011).
Notably, the Colorado district court did not similarly so hold. Rather, it simply found that no
contractual right to a specific cost-of-living adjustment existed, and did not consider whether,
had such a right existed, it would have been impaired by legislature's changing of the statutory
cost-of-living adjustment formula. See Justus v. State, No. 2010-CV-1589, slip op. at 10 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011) (holding that the court need not consider "the second and third parts of
the DeWitt test"). The second part of the DeWitt test requires the court to examine whether "a
change in the law impairs [a] contractual relationship." In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849, 858
(Colo. 2002).
200. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19.
201. Id. at 25.
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could implement to achieve the same result. In other words, states
could institute policies that would return their public employee
pension funds to solvency without impairing their contractual
obligations to employees who have already vested in the systems. For
example, states could raise taxes and use the increased revenue to
fully fund the public employee pension funds to the extent of their
actuarially calculated liability. Alternatively, states could reduce the
amount of pension benefits that they will give employees who have not
yet become vested in the systems. The latter would be permissible
because there would not yet be a contract between unvested
employees and the states. Thus, impairment of the obligation of the
government's contract with vested public employees is not "necessary"
to return the states' public employee pension funds to solvency.
Therefore, assuming that a contractual right to a specific cost-of-living
adjustment exists, the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution
prohibits this type of modification.
V. A RETURN TO SOLVENCY: PRESERVING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION
FUNDS WITHOUT OFFENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

As discussed above, there is a strong argument that proposed
public employee pension plan reforms that reduce the amount of
pension benefits to which current retirees are entitled violate the U.S.
Constitution. Depending on whether states define public employee
pension benefits as property rights or contract rights, a case can be
made for a violation of either the Takings Clause or the Contracts
Clause. However, it is ultimately up to state courts to determine
whether a public employee has a property right or a contract right to a
particular pension benefit. In Colorado and Minnesota, state courts
have concluded that there are no such rights, leaving retired public
employees with no recourse under the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, to
ensure retired public employees are adequately protected and that the
pension crisis does not repeat itself, Congress should explore the
possibility of federal regulation of state public employee pension plans.
Congress already regulates private pension plans through
ERISA. The purpose of ERISA is "to standardize the regulation of
private pension plans, while simultaneously providing tax incentives
to employers to encourage the development of employee benefit
programs." 20 2 One objective of ERISA is to ensure that benefits plans

202. Jon G. Miller, Is Your Client's Government Pension Safe?: Making the Case for Federal
Regulation, 2 ELDER L.J. 121, 136 (1994).
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are adequately funded. 20 3 In order to enforce this objective, ERISA
"establishes an elaborate set of rules to determine and enforce
minimum funding requirements." 20 4 Establishing a minimum funding
requirement that is applicable to state public employee pension plans
would go a long way toward ensuring that states no longer
consistently underfund their pension obligations.
Federal regulation of state public employee pension plans
would prevent states from engaging in the bad practices that brought
about the trillion-dollar shortfall between public employee pension
benefits promised and public employee pension benefits funded. While
states could possibly solve this problem without congressional
intervention, federal legislation best ensures that all states will
establish sustainable practices. To ensure pension fund solvency,
states will have to either raise taxes or reduce spending in other areas
in order to funnel much-needed money into the public employee
pension funds. Both choices are politically unpopular, and federal
legislation best ensures states will make the difficult decisions they
must make in order to ensure pension fund solvency.
Members of the House of Representatives have proposed that
Congress regulate state and local government pensions. The proposed
bill, known as the Public Employee Pension Transparency Act, notes
that "[t]here currently is a lack of meaningful disclosure regarding the
value of State or local government employee pension benefit plan
assets and liabilities."' 20 5 The bill, if passed, would mandate increased
disclosure "in order to adequately protect plan participants and their
beneficiaries and the general public." 20 6 Specifically, the bill would
amend the Internal Revenue Code to require that state and local
government pensions file annual reports disclosing the "current
liability of the plan, the amount of plan assets available to meet that
liability, the amount of the net unfunded liability ...and the funding
percentage of the plan."20 7 Additionally, pension plan administrators
would be required to disclose the actuarial assumptions on which they
based their data, as well as a contribution schedule for the current
year and "alternative projections ... for each of the next 20 plan
years... with a statement of the assumptions and methods used in
connection with [the] projections, including assumptions related to
203. Id. at 137.
204. Id. at 138; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2006) (describing ERISA's minimum funding
standards in detail).
205. H.R. 567, 112th Cong. § 2(10) (2011).
206. Id. § 2(11).
207. Id. § 3.
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funding policy, plan changes, future workforce projections, [and]
future investment returns." 20 8 If the bill is passed, states that do not
comply with the reporting requirements will be denied certain federal
20 9
tax benefits.
While the Public Employee Pension Transparency Act is a good
start, further regulation is needed to ensure that state employees will
no longer fall victim to the mismanagement of their pension funds.
Specifically, Congress should enact minimum funding requirements
similar to those already in place for private employers under ERISA.
In the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Congress amended ERISA to
require private employee pension plans to be fully funded-a plan's
assets must exceed the plan's liabilities at all times, and employers
must increase contributions to eliminate any shortfall. 2 10 Establishing
a similar requirement for state employee pension funds would ensure
those funds remain sustainable.
While such legislation already exists in the private sector, it is
unclear whether Congress has the power to regulate the states
directly in this way. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." 211 In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.' "212 One could argue that
requiring states to establish minimum funding requirements for
public employee pensions impermissibly forces state governments to
213
submit to federal regulation.
208. Id.
209. Id. The tax benefits include the exemption from gross income for interest on state or
local bonds under 26 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); credits against taxable income for qualified tax credit
bonds, under 26 U.S.C. § 54A (2006); credits associated with Build America bonds under 26
U.S.C. § 54AA (2006); and credits allowed to issuers of qualified bonds under 26 U.S.C. § 6431
(2006). H.R. 567 § 3.
210. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1083 (West 2010) (describing the minimum required contributions
that private employers must make to their pension funds).
211. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
212. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
213. See id. at 175-76 ("On the other hand, the second alternative held out to state
governments-regulating pursuant to Congress' direction-would, standing alone, present a
simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress. As we have
seen, the Constitution does not empower Congress to subject state governments to this type of

instruction."). One could also argue that Congress does have the power to regulate public
employee pensions directly, particularly in light of the fact that Garcia v. San Antonio
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In order to avoid these Tenth Amendment concerns, this Note
suggests Congress use its taxing and spending power to incentivize
states to implement the minimum funding requirements. 214 The Court
approves of Congress's attempts to condition the receipt of federal
funds on states' adopting federal regulatory programs, so long as the
conditions imposed are: (1) "in pursuit of the general welfare"; (2) clear
and unambiguous; (3) related "to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs"; and (4) not designed to "induce the
States to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional."2 15 The conditions must also not be "so coercive as to
pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' "216
To encourage states to adopt the minimum funding
requirements discussed above while still protecting the pensions of
retired employees, Congress should offer states the power to issue taxexempt bonds for the purpose of raising money for public employee
pension funds so long as the states agree to establish the minimum
funding requirements proposed above and agree not to reduce the
2 17
annual cost-of-living adjustments current retirees receive.
Currently, bonds issued to raise money to fund public employee
pensions "are fully taxable." 21 8 States would likely want the ability to
issue tax-exempt pension bonds, because such bonds allow states to
raise money to fund pension plans more inexpensively by being able to
offer lower interest rates than those of any fully taxable bonds that
the states presently issue.
This type of incentive avoids the constitutional concerns that
direct regulation might pose. First, granting states the ability to issue

Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which held that Congress has the power to
extend the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to public
employers, has never been overturned and remains good law. The extent to which the Tenth
Amendment limits Congress's power to act is beyond the scope of this Note. The solution offered
below assumes that the Tenth Amendment does bar direct regulation and offers a workaround. If
there is no Tenth Amendment problem, Congress may simply regulate directly, exercising its
Commerce Clause powers. See Miller, supra note 202, at 140 (discussing Congress's authority to
regulate public employee pensions under the Commerce Clause).
214. For a defense of using the taxing and spending power to encourage regulation in ways
that Congress cannot regulate directly because of the Tenth Amendment, see New York, 505 U.S.
at 167-69.
215. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08, 210 (1987) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
216. Id. at 211.
217. For a similar proposal, see Joshua Rauh & Robert Novy-Marx, Pension Security Bonds:
A New Plan to Address the State Pension Crisis, ECONOMISTS' VOICE, June 2010, at 1, 2-3.
218. Id. at 2.
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tax-exempt pension bonds is "in pursuit of the general welfare." 219 The
Court typically defers to Congress's judgment when evaluating this
requirement, and there is nothing to suggest that it would not do so
here. This is particularly likely because issuing tax-exempt pension
bonds allows states to raise money to fund public employee pensions
more inexpensively than they currently are able to raise, reducing the
amount of pension funding taken from other areas (such as the
reduction of services).
Second, the conditions with which states would be required to
comply are clear and unambiguous. A state would simply have to
agree to comply with the minimum funding requirement for public
employee pensions. It would also have to agree not to reduce the
annual cost-of-living adjustment for retired public employees. The
state would therefore be able to knowingly decide whether to opt in to
the regulations or to forego the opportunity to issue tax-exempt
bonds. 220 Third, the conditions proposed "bear [a] relationship to the
purpose of the federal spending." 221 The purpose of the regulations is
to ensure that state governments adequately support their public
pension obligations without unjustly burdening retired public
employees, and granting the exemption enables states to do so in a
way that is economically feasible. Fourth, the incentive does not
induce states to engage in unconstitutional activity-nothing in the
Constitution prohibits states from establishing minimum funding
requirements for public employee pensions. Finally, the conditions are
not so coercive as to be impermissible. Should a state choose not to opt
in to the minimum funding requirements, the worst-case scenario is
the continuation of the status quo. States will still be able to issue
pension bonds, but those bonds would be fully taxable. Additionally,
states choosing to opt out would still be able to use other methods to
222
raise money to fund pension obligations.
Even if Congress is not able to force the states to establish
minimum funding requirements for public employee pension plans
directly, Congress can still persuade states to opt in to regulations in
this area. Congress may exercise its taxing and spending power to

219. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
220. See id. ("[W]e have required that if Congress desires to condition the States' receipt of
enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice
federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously ....
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.") (second alteration in original)
(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
221. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08).
222. See supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing potential alternative solutions to solving the state
pension crisis).
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condition states' abilities to issue tax-exempt bonds for the purpose of
funding public employee pensions on states' agreeing to adopt the
proposed minimum funding requirement.
VI. CONCLUSION

The current pension shortfalls are a serious problem facing
many state and local governments today. The town of Prichard,
Alabama, presents an extreme example. For years, experts warned the
city that its budget was unsustainable and predicted the funds would
dry up. 223 In 2009, that prediction came true. The city ran out of
money and could no longer write pension checks to its retired
employees. 224 Many retirees had retired prior to becoming eligible for
Social Security benefits in reliance on the pension income that they
were promised. 225 Now, with the city unable to fulfill its promise,
many struggle to make ends meet. Some filed for bankruptcy. Others,
like the retired fire marshal found dead in a home without electricity
226
or running water, have fared much worse.
While repetition of the situation in Prichard in other
communities must be avoided, the Colorado, Minnesota, and South
Dakota reforms are not the solution. Those reforms unfairly burden
retired public employees, who dedicated their careers to public service,
often for less money than they would have made in the private sector,
and who are now being forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of
the burden of the states' years of pension fund mismanagement.
If history is any guide, relying on the states to solve this
problem may not prove to be a reliable solution. Years of poor
practices by state government officials led to this crisis in the first
place, and it is not yet clear whether states are committed to a
workable solution. 227 Moreover, as the recent Colorado and Minnesota
decisions clearly indicate, state courts cannot be trusted to protect
public employees from these unfair laws. Because state courts are the
final arbiters of the content of a public employee's contract or property
right to pension benefits, even the U.S. Constitution may not be able
to protect public employees. This Note therefore urges Congress to
encourage states to adopt minimum funding requirements for public
223. Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, In Town That Stopped Checks, A Warning on
Public Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, at Al.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See supra Part II.
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employee pensions that mirror those found in ERISA by authorizing
states that adopt such requirements to issue tax-exempt bonds to
raise money to fund public employee pensions, provided that states do
not decrease the annual cost-of-living adjustment for currently retired
employees. This approach will make it easier for states to raise money
to fund public employee pensions while at the same time requiring
states to contribute enough money to fully fund all promised benefits.
By ensuring their public employee pension plans are funded to the
extent of their actuarially calculated liability, states that choose to
take advantage of this program will avert a future crisis without
unfairly burdening retired public employees who faithfully served the
very government that is now asking them to shoulder a
disproportionate burden.
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